Tang, Shirley (2026) “Accountable Secrecy: The Appropriability of Process Innovation Under Public Scrutiny” [PDF]
Forthcoming, Management Science
Strategy Research Foundation (SRF) Dissertation Grant 2022
Best Paper in the Stream of Innovation and Entrepreneurship, Industry Studies Association Conference (ISA) 2023
Best Student Paper, TIM Division, Academy of Management 2023
Runner-up, INFORMS/Organization Science Best Dissertation Proposal Competition 2022
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Disclosure of granular, process-level information is increasingly used to govern risky technologies, yet it introduces a strategic tension: the same transparency that allows stakeholders to monitor harm also exposes proprietary know-how to rivals. This paper explores the accountability–appropriability trade-off in U.S. hydraulic fracturing, where regulators require well operators to disclose well-level chemical use but permit trade-secret redactions. Linking ingredient-level disclosures for wells completed between 2011 and 2019 to data on drilling permits, productivity, and chemical toxicity, I exploit state-year variation in public scrutiny to compare wells drilled in the same shale formations and time periods but exposed to different scrutiny environments. Heightened scrutiny is associated with lower use of toxic chemicals, and conservative bounds analyses indicate that this pattern is not explained solely by relabeling toxic ingredients as secrets. The transparency response, however, depends on appropriability conditions. Scrutiny is associated with fewer redactions only when disclosure presents lower imitation risks: in more concentrated local markets or when operators possess localized complementary assets that protect innovation rents without reliance on secrecy. By developing the concept of accountable secrecy, this paper bridges stakeholder governance, innovation strategy, and the resource-based view, and identifies a critical boundary of stakeholder governance: while external pressure can force the internalization of social costs, transparency over process knowledge remains bounded by the need to protect competitive advantage. For policy, the implication is that effective disclosure regimes must make hazard-relevant conduct auditable while maintaining incentives to invest in process innovation.
Tang, Shirley, Daniel W. Elfenbein, and Tatenda Pasipanodya (2026). “Can Voluntary Corporate Transparency Curb Corruption? Community-Level Evidence from Oil and Gas Fields in Africa” [PDF]
Forthcoming, Organization Science
Distinguished Paper Award—Nonmarket Strategy Track, STR Division, AOM 2024
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Voluntary corporate transparency seeks to promote accountability through disclosure, but substantive reporting does not by itself guarantee societal benefits. We examine whether this form of self-regulation can help curb corruption where formal oversight is weak, focusing on corporate support for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a multistakeholder initiative that promotes disclosure of company payments to host governments. We link geolocated data on African oil and gas fields and their operators to Afrobarometer surveys and satellite nighttime-light measures and estimate difference-in-differences models that track changes in outcomes around the same fields before and after operators endorse the EITI. We find that corporate EITI support is associated with lower perceived corruption and less reported bribery, greater civic engagement, greater perceived freedom to speak, and higher nighttime-light intensity, a proxy for local economic activity. The association with lower perceived corruption is stronger around fields with nearby NGO or aid-project activity, among residents living closer to fields, and among frequent users of traditional news media. Supplementary analyses provide indirect evidence that supporting firms were more transparent before mandatory disclosure laws took effect, and show that they had fewer joint-venture partners and larger ownership stakes after endorsement. Archival cases from Nigeria and Ghana illustrate how civil-society organizations and journalists use extractive-industry information to question firms and public authorities. The findings point to local governance benefits of voluntary transparency commitments and are consistent with an information-to-accountability account in which these benefits depend on both substantive reporting and local opportunities to scrutinize and use the information.
Tang, Shirley, Daniel W. Elfenbein, and Tatenda Pasipanodya (2026). “Self-regulation, Corruption, and Competitiveness in Extractive Industries: Making Transparency Pay” [PDF]
Strategic Management Journal, 46(12), 2945–2974, December 2025.
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Self-regulation is often proposed as a substitute for government regulation. We examine a setting in which a subset of firms voluntarily committed to transparency standards despite immediate competitive disadvantages, not merely to preempt regulation but to succeed under future mandatory rules they helped enact through lobbying. Focusing on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), an anti-corruption multi-stakeholder initiative, we show that firms initially suffered competitive costs in corrupt markets after endorsing EITI. These firms subsequently lobbied for mandatory disclosure regulations. Once mandatory rules took effect, previously disadvantaged transparent firms gained substantial competitive advantages. Our study highlights how firms can integrate voluntary commitment with political advocacy to resolve collective action problems, reshaping both competitive dynamics and the regulatory landscape.
Carnahan, Seth, Lamar Pierce, and Shirley Tang (2026). “Clutch Performers” [PDF]
Best Conference Paper, Strategy Science Conference 2026, University of Colorado Boulder
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This paper examines the widespread yet unsubstantiated lay theory that “clutch” high performance under pressure is a unique individual attribute defining some star employees. We subject this lay theory to the first empirical test in typical firms, using over one million new automobile sales by 21,896 salespeople at 1,034 franchised dealerships. These salespeople regularly face high month-end pressure due to lucrative dealer sales incentives from manufacturers. We first establish clutch lay theory through a survey and conjoint analysis of automotive sales managers, then employ multilevel mixed models to show that employees’ performance under pressure closely mirrors their low-pressure performance. The rare clutch performers in our data have little economic importance and are likely unidentifiable to management. Star salespeople are consistently stars, while average employees are consistently average. Our paper provides an example of why lay theories are poor substitutes for scientific theory developed through logic or induction, and why rigorous empirical work with null findings is an important tool for advancing theory. We caution managers against categorizing employees as “clutch” or “anti-clutch” performers, given the risk that anecdotal or small-sample performance differences under pressure might reflect random chance and not underlying employee contribution or value. Doing so can not only hurt organizational performance but can also increase inequity when stereotypes and other cognitive biases fuel worker miscategorization.
Belenzon, Sharon, Alberto Galasso, Honggi Lee, and Shirley Tang (2026). “Enterprise Liability and the Organizational Response to Hazardous-Chemical Regulation”
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How does organizational structure affect the impact of information-based regulation? We study this question in European hazardous chemical regulation, where compliance is recorded at the level of egal-entity registrants but production decisions are made by corporate groups that control multiple subsidiaries. We develop a model in which a hazard listing increases expected liability by making damages more likely after harm occurs. Because enterprise liability varies across jurisdictions, the same listing changes expected costs differentially across subsidiaries within the same group. Multi-subsidiary groups may therefore respond by selectively ceasing at high-liability subsidiaries while maintaining the chemical elsewhere in the organization.
We test the model using staggered hazard listings under the EU’s REACH framework and the NGO-maintained SIN list, matched to European Chemicals Agency registration records, Orbis corporate ownership data, and country-level measures of piercing-the-corporate-veil risk. Listing raises the annual probability of registrant-level cessation by about 1.9 percentage points from a baseline near one percent. Aggregating to the corporate-group level reveals that this response differs sharply by organizational structure. For chemicals registered by a single subsidiary within a group, listing primarily induces group exit. For chemicals registered by multiple subsidiaries in the same group, listing induces selective cessation rather than proportional group exit. Within selective-cessation events, ceased subsidiaries are located in higher enterprise-liability jurisdictions than continuing subsidiaries and have lower profit-to-liability ratios. The results are robust to event-study estimators, placebo listing dates, alternative clustering, predetermined organizational structure, country-level confound checks, and tests for substitute availability. The findings show how corporate groups can transform legal-entity compliance into group-level continuation, revealing a structural boundary condition for information-based regulation.
Select work-in-progress
Regulatory uncertainty, managerial cognition, and M&As (with Yishu Li)
Directed technical change with information disclosure (with Felix Poege and Xina Li)
Distributed accountability in innovation supply chains (with Parasuram Balasubramanian and Yishu Li)
A project on CCUS (with Hila Belinson and Shipeng Yan)
Commercial secrecy (with Yufeng Xia)