This paper examines the widespread yet unsubstantiated lay theory that “clutch” high performance under pressure is a unique individual attribute defining some star employees. We subject this lay theory to the first empirical test in typical firms, using over one million new automobile sales by 21,896 salespeople at 1,034 franchised dealerships. These salespeople regularly face high month-end pressure due to lucrative dealer sales incentives from manufacturers. We first establish clutch lay theory through a survey and conjoint analysis of automotive sales managers, then employ multilevel mixed models to show that employees’ performance under pressure closely mirrors their low-pressure performance. The rare clutch performers in our data have little economic importance and are likely unidentifiable to management. Star salespeople are consistently stars, while average employees are consistently average. Our paper provides an example of why lay theories are poor substitutes for scientific theory developed through logic or induction, and why rigorous empirical work with null findings is an important tool for advancing theory. We caution managers against categorizing employees as “clutch” or “anti-clutch” performers, given the risk that anecdotal or small-sample performance differences under pressure might reflect random chance and not underlying employee contribution or value. Doing so can not only hurt organizational performance but can also increase inequity when stereotypes and other cognitive biases fuel worker miscategorization.

How does organizational structure affect the impact of information-based regulation? We study this question in European hazardous chemical regulation, where compliance is recorded at the level of egal-entity registrants but production decisions are made by corporate groups that control multiple subsidiaries. We develop a model in which a hazard listing increases expected liability by making damages more likely after harm occurs. Because enterprise liability varies across jurisdictions, the same listing changes expected costs differentially across subsidiaries within the same group. Multi-subsidiary groups may therefore respond by selectively ceasing at high-liability subsidiaries while maintaining the chemical elsewhere in the organization.

We test the model using staggered hazard listings under the EU’s REACH framework and the NGO-maintained SIN list, matched to European Chemicals Agency registration records, Orbis corporate ownership data, and country-level measures of piercing-the-corporate-veil risk. Listing raises the annual probability of registrant-level cessation by about 1.9 percentage points from a baseline near one percent. Aggregating to the corporate-group level reveals that this response differs sharply by organizational structure. For chemicals registered by a single subsidiary within a group, listing primarily induces group exit. For chemicals registered by multiple subsidiaries in the same group, listing induces selective cessation rather than proportional group exit. Within selective-cessation events, ceased subsidiaries are located in higher enterprise-liability jurisdictions than continuing subsidiaries and have lower profit-to-liability ratios. The results are robust to event-study estimators, placebo listing dates, alternative clustering, predetermined organizational structure, country-level confound checks, and tests for substitute availability. The findings show how corporate groups can transform legal-entity compliance into group-level continuation, revealing a structural boundary condition for information-based regulation.