This study explores how some oil and gas firms sought to leverage participation in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—a multi-stakeholder, anti-corruption initiative—to their advantage by re-aligning their market and non-market strategies. Firms with strong technical capabilities and origins in high-governance countries were more likely to support EITI, and these firms repositioned their operations both geographically and in technological space to mitigate risks of transparency commitments. After mandatory disclosure rules were introduced, EITI supporters secured more oil and gas licenses than non-supporters. Analysis of lobbying records reveals how these firms integrated political activity with capability development to strengthen competitiveness. The findings highlight how voluntary initiatives can promote competitiveness by aligning self-regulation with strategic goals in dynamic regulatory environments and complex stakeholder ecosystems.

Can voluntary self-regulatory institutions address corruption in weak institutional environments? Prevailing wisdom suggests that absent rigorous enforcement, such initiatives may merely generate symbolic gestures. We revisit this conclusion by examining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)—a multi-stakeholder effort designed to deter corruption in resource-rich countries. Linking annual firm-level EITI membership with Afrobarometer survey data and satellite-based measures of local economic activity, we find lower perceptions of corruption, greater civic engagement, and increased economic development near the oil and gas operations of firms after they become EITI members. We argue that, in these weak institutional environments, external pressure from civil society and global NGOs can partly substitute for formal legal enforcement, inducing genuine adherence to self-imposed transparency standards, which in turn, meaningfully improve governance and development outcomes.

This paper examines the widespread yet unsubstantiated lay theory that “clutch” high performance under pressure is a unique individual attribute defining some star employees. We subject this lay theory to the first empirical test in typical firms, using over one million new automobile sales by 21,896 salespeople at 1,034 franchised dealerships. These salespeople regularly face high month-end pressure due to lucrative dealer sales incentives from manufacturers. We first establish clutch lay theory through a survey and conjoint analysis of automotive sales managers, then employ multilevel mixed models to show that employees’ performance under pressure closely mirrors their low-pressure performance. The rare clutch performers in our data have little economic importance and are likely unidentifiable to management. Star salespeople are consistently stars, while average employees are consistently average. Our paper provides an example of why lay theories are poor substitutes for scientific theory developed through logic or induction, and why rigorous empirical work with null findings is an important tool for advancing theory. We caution managers against categorizing employees as “clutch” or “anti-clutch” performers, given the risk that anecdotal or small-sample performance differences under pressure might reflect random chance and not underlying employee contribution or value. Doing so can not only hurt organizational performance but can also increase inequity when stereotypes and other cognitive biases fuel worker miscategorization.

This study investigates how firms navigate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) under the heightened uncertainty of pending or canceled regulations. Drawing on the Theory-Based View, we argue that managerial cognition—specifically, forward-looking and causal reasoning abilities—moderates the tendency of regulatory risk to deter M&As. Using a novel “Regulatory Pipeline” measure of impending policy proposals and text-based indicators of managerial cognition from conference calls, we find that although regulatory uncertainty typically suppresses deal-making, firms exhibiting stronger cognitive capabilities are significantly more likely to proceed with acquisitions. Our study contributes to research on strategic decision-making under uncertainty by offering new measures of cognition and evidence that firms with high cognitive capabilities can better interpret and respond to unpredictable policy environments.